Rating: 
Summary: Practical book
Review: "On War" is a simple book to read and understand. It is a practical guide not only to the methodology, but to psychology of actual armed combat. "On War" has, for instance, the only meaningful justification for strictly following chain of command: If soldiers are in danger, they will follow their own desire for safety, all else being equal, but the mission and the greater situation are presumed to be known by higher headquarters, therefore the soldiers' following chain of command is essential. The distortions of this basic purpose of chain of command within organizations, especially governmental organization, even in peacetime, is legendary. "On War" addresses the necessity of commanders' judging the relative values of different units and how they match up against the enemy. It may not be the best thing for a commander to throw his best troops (in training, equipment, etc) against the enemy's best troops. If the need is to check the enemy, as to delay him or force him to take a less advangageous way or to walk rather than ride, and that mission can be done by lesser troops, those lesser troops should be employed (even if it means more dead and wounded) and the better troops held back to deliver more decisive blows.
"On War" is a quite cynical look at armed war. It is said that the ancient Spartans did not ask how many the enemy were, only where they were. Such gut-level thinking is the antithesis of von Clausewitz's teachings.
Rating: 
Summary: Unsurpassed classic of its field.
Review: "On War" is essential reading for the professional military and for historians, and is of great value to those with an interest in public policy.That said, it is not easy to read. There are three primary reasons for this: First, it is unfinished. The first chapter ("book" as Clausewitz called it) is sharp, well-organized and focused, other chapters are so-so, and still others are almost formless collections of notes. Second, Clausewitz is thinking philosophically. Most people, including many or most in his target audience, are unaccustomed to thinking this way, and find it difficult to re-orient themselves. Third, parts of it are firmly locked in a particular time and place. The reader must work to determine what (if any) lessons in those parts are of enduring value and must understand references that, however clear they would have been to his contemporaries, are today obscure. So, given all of the above, it is fair for the reader to ask why he should bother. The reason is the power of Clausewitz's answers to: (1) What is the nature of war itself? (2) What is war's relation to the larger world in which it exists? (3) How can success in war be achieved? Clausewitz's answer to question (1) is that war in itself is a duel on a large scale, which unless acted on from the outside, tends towards the maximum possible amount of violence. This discussion of "pure war" has probably been responsible for more mis-interpretations of Clausewitz than anything else he wrote. He is writing philosophically - trying to understand the nature of the thing, and some readers mis-read him as writing prescriptively - that because "pure war" (or "ideal war") tends towards maximum violence, that those conducting war should employ maximum violence. Clausewitz's answer to question (2) is one of the major reasons why "pure war" doesn't, can't, and shouldn't exist in the real world. First, real war occurs over time - not as a single event but as a series of events. This provides the opportunity for other forces to act upon it. The most important outside force acting upon it is political - war it is only a means - and the end is the political purposes which the war serves. The means cannot and must not trump the end. This is his famous dictum "War is a continuation of policy by other means". The level of effort is conditioned by the end which the war serves as well as all the other ends the state is pursuing which may or may not be compatible with the war. It is in his answer to (3), how success in war can be achieved, that Clausewitz is at his most period-bound. He draws heavily from examples that would have been as familiar to his contemporaries as the Gulf War is to us, but time has rendered them often obscure. Further, many of his recommendations are completely tied to how war was conducted on land in the early 19th century. Those who say that they got little out of Clausewitz are often referring to this subject area.* There is quite a bit of value here, but it is obtained at effort - the reader must back up to the principals that govern Clausewitz's thinking, and re-apply them to the current technical means. Because of this, there is the irony that Clausewitz would have contributed much more here if he had written much less. Of course, he might have done so if he had finished his manuscript, but on this we can only guess. It is in the sum of (1), (2) and (3) that the value of Clausewitz is felt. The reader who makes the effort will find that he has acquired a systematic approach for thinking about war, a unified framework that includes the public policy perspective of when, whether, and how to employ it, as well as the military perspective of how to fight it. --- * For at least topic (3), ideally the modern reader should have read at least short military histories of the Seven Years War (in Europe - not North America) as well as the Napoleonic Wars, as these two conflicts dominate Clausewitz's references. What you want to know is the names of the major battles, the sides, and the outcomes. Maps are invaluable. Having a somewhat more in-depth reference handy can also be beneficial, though not necessary. If I had to recommend in-depth references, I would suggest, for the Napoleonic Wars, David Chandler's "The Campaigns of Napoleon" or Esposito and Elting's "A Military History and Atlas of the Napoleonic Wars". Both are readily available and well worth having. For the Seven Years War, I don't know of anything that is good and in-print, although Christopher Duffy's "The Military Life of Frederick the Great" is just what you want if you can find a copy.
Rating:
Summary: Unsurpassed classic of its field.
Review: "On War" is essential reading for the professional military and for historians, and is of great value to those with an interest in public policy. That said, it is not easy to read. There are three primary reasons for this: First, it is unfinished. The first chapter ("book" as Clausewitz called it) is sharp, well-organized and focused, other chapters are so-so, and still others are almost formless collections of notes. Second, Clausewitz is thinking philosophically. Most people, including many or most in his target audience, are unaccustomed to thinking this way, and find it difficult to re-orient themselves. Third, parts of it are firmly locked in a particular time and place. The reader must work to determine what (if any) lessons in those parts are of enduring value and must understand references that, however clear they would have been to his contemporaries, are today obscure. So, given all of the above, it is fair for the reader to ask why he should bother. The reason is the power of Clausewitz's answers to: (1) What is the nature of war itself? (2) What is war's relation to the larger world in which it exists? (3) How can success in war be achieved? Clausewitz's answer to question (1) is that war in itself is a duel on a large scale, which unless acted on from the outside, tends towards the maximum possible amount of violence. This discussion of "pure war" has probably been responsible for more mis-interpretations of Clausewitz than anything else he wrote. He is writing philosophically - trying to understand the nature of the thing, and some readers mis-read him as writing prescriptively - that because "pure war" (or "ideal war") tends towards maximum violence, that those conducting war should employ maximum violence. Clausewitz's answer to question (2) is one of the major reasons why "pure war" doesn't, can't, and shouldn't exist in the real world. First, real war occurs over time - not as a single event but as a series of events. This provides the opportunity for other forces to act upon it. The most important outside force acting upon it is political - war it is only a means - and the end is the political purposes which the war serves. The means cannot and must not trump the end. This is his famous dictum "War is a continuation of policy by other means". The level of effort is conditioned by the end which the war serves as well as all the other ends the state is pursuing which may or may not be compatible with the war. It is in his answer to (3), how success in war can be achieved, that Clausewitz is at his most period-bound. He draws heavily from examples that would have been as familiar to his contemporaries as the Gulf War is to us, but time has rendered them often obscure. Further, many of his recommendations are completely tied to how war was conducted on land in the early 19th century. Those who say that they got little out of Clausewitz are often referring to this subject area.* There is quite a bit of value here, but it is obtained at effort - the reader must back up to the principals that govern Clausewitz's thinking, and re-apply them to the current technical means. Because of this, there is the irony that Clausewitz would have contributed much more here if he had written much less. Of course, he might have done so if he had finished his manuscript, but on this we can only guess. It is in the sum of (1), (2) and (3) that the value of Clausewitz is felt. The reader who makes the effort will find that he has acquired a systematic approach for thinking about war, a unified framework that includes the public policy perspective of when, whether, and how to employ it, as well as the military perspective of how to fight it. --- * For at least topic (3), ideally the modern reader should have read at least short military histories of the Seven Years War (in Europe - not North America) as well as the Napoleonic Wars, as these two conflicts dominate Clausewitz's references. What you want to know is the names of the major battles, the sides, and the outcomes. Maps are invaluable. Having a somewhat more in-depth reference handy can also be beneficial, though not necessary. If I had to recommend in-depth references, I would suggest, for the Napoleonic Wars, David Chandler's "The Campaigns of Napoleon" or Esposito and Elting's "A Military History and Atlas of the Napoleonic Wars". Both are readily available and well worth having. For the Seven Years War, I don't know of anything that is good and in-print, although Christopher Duffy's "The Military Life of Frederick the Great" is just what you want if you can find a copy.
Rating:
Summary: teaches you how to think
Review: A fine book that teaches how to think and reason properly.His attitude of taking nothing for granted,and a few exceptionally applicable chapters make up for it's age,and so called out-dated material Von Clausewitz is read by officers and investors alike .It is a building block in logic.A fine work that must be slowly digested and enjoyed. Von Clausewitz was a genious.
Rating:
Summary: Incomplete text
Review: A word of caution to anyone ordering the paperback edition of this work. It is incomplete with some of the books missing. If you are genuinely interested in strategy, buy the hardcover Everyman's edition rather than the Penguin edition.
Rating:
Summary: Very useful for military officers and war-lovers!
Review: Adorned with many historical examples, this book is certainly history's greatest masterpiece. Continuously emphasizing that war is 'a continuity of policy by other means', Clausewitz, in his 20 years' work, has defined perfectly the theory of war, its tactical and strategic purposes;the means of attack and defense,before firstly defining clearly what war really is, how it works,and how its nature works in practice, and delightfully summarizing all the means of war in the book of 'War Plans'. This book explains what had been a cloud of uncertainty for people before his age, and closely examines the strategies of history's greatest generals, that is, Frederick the Great and Napoleon I(whom he said to be the God of War)during the Seven Years' War and down to the battle of the first until sixth coalition, and finally owing much spaces to the battle of Jena (1806),the wars of liberation (1814-15), and the disastrous marches to Moscow (1812).This book is certainly presented to military officers and anybody interested in the course of war. Moreover, you need not worry about your age or nationality. This book declares about strategy in general; and gives delight even to an Indonesian 11-year old girl like me. If you're truly interested in the course and history of war, I bet that this book will give you *BEAUCOUP DE MOMENTS INTERESSANTS*. NE ME CROIS PAS? ALORS,TU PEUX LE LIS ET LE PREUVE!
Rating: 
Summary: Brilliant but boring
Review: Although this clearly is a brilliant attempt to conceptualize the theoretical background of war, this is not an easy reading, and I would discourage anyone who is not particularly interested in the works of Von Cleusewitz from reading 'On War'. However, when put in the context of the time that Clauswitz was working on this colossal piece of strategic thought - the first part of the 19th century, we can only marvel at Clausewitz's military genius. Almost two hundred years ago he managed to lay out the base of the modern military strategy with concepts such as Die Schlacht- the credible threat of total destruction which today relates to the nuclear weapons, concentrated and mobile maneuver strategy - essentially WWII's Blietzkrieg etc. However, these brilliant parts get lost in the chapters that are completely irrelevant to today's state of technology. Furthermore, only the first chapter was finished by Clausewitz, all the rest was on the level of first drafts only when a decease took Clausewtiz's life. I would recommend going to the glossary of On War and familiarizing yourself with the topics discussed in a certain chapter before reading it - might save you a lot of time and effort.
Rating:
Summary: AVOID the Penguin Edition of "On War"
Review: AVOID THE PENGUIN EDITION AT ALL COSTS! Yes, it is the most widely available version of Clausewitz' famous work, "On War", a great book that should be in everyone's library, but the Penguin edition is to be avoided at all costs. The Penguin Classics edition is poorly edited and uses the Graham/Maude translation from the original 19th century German. It was put together by Anatol Rapoport, a self styled 60's renaissance man with an axe to grind against Henry Kissinger (a Clausewitz devotee) and a viceral hatred of Claucewitz himself. Rapoprt misleadingly abridged Clausewitz's own writings, while retaining many of the errors introdced by Maude and Graham that when combined with Rapoport's hostility toward Neo-Clausewitzean ideas (and Clausewitz himself) create a volume found in the Penguin edition that is so badly misleading as of Clausewitz's ideas as to be worthless. Clausewitz is worth a read but if you have the Penguin Classics or Graham/Maude translations I strongly advise you to burn the book and look instead for either the Jolles or Paret translations.
Rating:
Summary: Exceptional as an Historical Memoir of Military Tactics
Review: Being a Participant in a few military "skirmishes", namely: Santo Domingan Revolution, Viet-Nam '65-'66, and others not-mentionable On War is a well put together memoir of the Napolionic Campaign by a rather aged military leader of the time. It is rather easy reading if you're able to understand the language of the time, If you want to assume a balance in the history of the time read the Duke of Wellington's Memoir in addition. On War is still required reading for militory history majors at our military colleges. Von Clausewitz was never a military genious. He did however have an excellent memory with copious notes written shortly after the engagements he led.
He was a masterful leader on the battlefield fully capable of making tactical decisions on horseback. The tactics and strategy used were appropriate for their historical place, even with the tremendous loss of life. He even had much respect for his enemy; and as such would have made a better diplomat at the defeat of Napoleon's Army; his position was not to anialate the French, rather to allow for a more respectical peace.
Comparing this work to Sun Tzu's "The Art of War" is like watching Emeril prepare an awesome dish to looking up an old recipe for meat loaf. Sun Tzu's brief, excellent and timeless hand book on how to wage war. Rather than the total destruction of the enemy, Sun Tzu's approach as to the purpose of war is Peace.
Conclusion: read them all, there is much to be gained and applicable today as there has been over the past.
Rating:
Summary: Not the best edition, but THE best book on war
Review: Carl von Clausewitz is required reading at the War Colleges of the United States Armed Forces because his precepts are timeless. Trying to understand why man makes war, especially in the extremely destructive era in which he lived, he explores all aspects of warfare. This work is written for military officers, and exemplifies the aphorism of a classic: it's a book people want to have read, but don't want to read. This antipathy is understandable. Clausewitz was a staff officer in the army of a state which no longer exists, and he wrote in 19th century German. Still, this book is essential to all who wish to understand war and its place in statecraft. Rather than this Penguin edition, I recommend the Princeton University Press edition, translated and edited by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. That version includes very helpful essays and introductions by those two academics, as well as Bernard Brodie. Together, these three help the reader understand what Clausewitz was writing, and gently remind the reader that he should be somewhat forgiving of the author. After all, he had only just begun a major renovation of his entire work when he was felled by the cholera epidemic that struck Europe. If you are interested in Clausewitz, READ HIM. Do not join the illiterati who quote and misquote him without ever reading On War. While it is not an easy read, the Princeton University edition is readable, and On War is the most important book on the most serious of political subjects.
|
