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Summary: When it comes to war, Clausewitz wrote the book
Review: Clausewitz treats war as a natural, social organism, which can best be understood by practical experience. In reaction to the attempts by Jomini and other strategists to rationalize the theory and practice of war into discernible, scientific laws, Clausewitz emphasizes the capriciousness of warfare. As in all human endeavors, chance is a random variable in the conduct of war. Implicit in Clausewitzian thought is a distinction between strategy and tactics. While certain principles are useful for tactical calculations, Clausewitz asserts that no "laws" for strategy exist; experience, though, can prove of great use to the military commander. Another Clausewitzian innovation is the idea that defense is a stronger form of war than offense. In defensive warfare, a greater degree of the state's internal resources (including her citizen-soldiers) are brought to bear on the military effort. Clearly, Clausewitz warns that offensive advantage, once it has lost its initial momentum or has seen its concentration of force weakened or divided, can quickly be transmuted into a defensive orientation. Thus, a good defense is necessary for good offense (even if only during momentary pauses).The main contribution of Clausewitz is represented by his maxim that "war is merely the continuation of policy by other means." In other words, war is basically an extension of politics. The initial motive for warfare is encapsulated by a political objective; war is a means to a political end. Clausewitz argues that policy permeates and essentially determines the character and extent of all military operations; the authority of the military commander is circumscribed by the political aims of the state. Thus, Clausewitz essentially maintains that the public sector (the state) must exercise authority over military operations. Although he has no use for military formulae, Clausewitz does offer one postulate: when the costs of the military effort exceed (in relative terms) the positive good of the political objective, then the state should seek a peaceful settlement. The good of the state depends on knowing when to stop fighting as well as when to start. The most important message conveyed by Clausewitz is that war is not an isolated phenomenon. Any considerations for waging war (offensive or defensive) must be based on the political situation at home, in the adversarial state, and in the world community of potential allies and enemies. Military strength in and of itself is not an adequate gauge for success. A defensive war can be a victorious effort, should the assailant overextend himself. Beyond this, the desire to maintain the balance of power is a strong stimulus for foreign involvement. All in all, Clausewitz portrays war as a human endeavor, involving chance (or "friction") as well as skill. War is not a game involving the maneuverability of human instruments; victory can only be secured on the battlefield. On War is a realistic, pragmatic approach to warfare in all its facets--skill and luck, offense and defense, battle and statecraft, etc. The subservience of the armed forces to political control remains a strong source of friction in today's states--this is only one aspect of the timelessness of Clausewitz's work. Certainly, On War is a long, difficult read. For those, both citizens and soldiers, who wish to truly understand warfare, however, it is required reading which will ultimately richly reward the diligent reader with much insight and knowledge.
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Summary: Outmoded and tedious vision of warfare.
Review: Clausewitz's book is a must-read if you inted to fight a Napoleonic war with musket and massed troops. World War I, however, made that an impossibility. It also illustrated just how misguided an adherence to Clausewitz's views can be in light of the influence of modern technology on the battlefield. I found this book to be pedantic and obsolete, but I can't condemn the work outright since it does hold interest for historians of warfare between the reigns of Napoleon and Wilhem II.
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Summary: Great Book--get the right edition.
Review: Clausewitz's ON WAR is certainly the greatest exploration of the subject, but we are often misled by sloppy or hostile summaries--especially those by British military historians, who have evolved a truly sophisticated culture of misrepresenting it. E.g., Clausewitz supposedly preaches "total war." In fact, that phrase appears only twice in the book, once while discussing the "total war area," i.e., the geographic theater of war, and once noting that "total war, the pure element of enmity unleashed," would be "pointless and devoid of sense." Most such misconceptions would be cleared up if writers would bother to read past the abstract first half of the first chapter to see what Clausewitz, an immensely experienced practical soldier, really thought. And forget the absurd distinctions between Jomini's "chivalrous" wars and Clausewitz's alleged war on civilians--the two men experienced and described exactly the same wars.
Likewise, to say that Asian warfare differs in some fundamental way from Western war, or from war in general, is nonsense, as is the idea that Sun Tzu--whose all-knowing general controls events far more than either Clausewitz or historical experience would suggest is possible--somehow represents a "decentralized" approach. Sun Tzu is extremely valuable, but he and Clausewitz are best understood together. Read Michael Handel on that.
There are several English translations of ON WAR, in many editions, and these vary greatly in value. Amazon's listings often confuse the different versions, so be careful. The version edited by biologist/musician Anatol Rapoport is particularly worthless. His lengthy, lunatic, 1968 introduction is actually about Kissinger, not Clausewitz. He used the hoary old 1873 Graham translation and severely abridged Clausewitz's own text, but weirdly retained the anachronistic Social Darwinist insertions of an earlier editor. The best and standard translation is Howard and Paret's, Princeton U. Press, 1976 (rev.1984). Knopf's elegant "Everyman's Library" hardcover (ISBN 0-679-42043-6) is the same translation with some useful added appendices and sidebars--and a better buy as well. Get more background at "The Clausewitz Homepage."
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Summary: This is the WRONG EDITION of this GREAT book to buy
Review: Clausewitz's ON WAR is truly one of the Great Books of Western thought. Unfortunately, THIS edition is NOT the one to buy. This is the weirdly edited and seriously misleading Penguin edition put together by Anatol Rapoport in 1968. Rapoport was a biologist and musician -- indeed, something of a renaissance man and later a brilliant game theorist. However, he was extremely hostile to the state system and to the alleged "neo-Clausewitzian," Henry Kissinger. He severely and misleadingly abridged an old but respectable translation (done by JJ Graham in 1873) but -- for reasons that surpasseth understanding -- he retained the often bizaare introduction, commentary, and notes inserted in 1908 by an imperialist and social-Darwinist editor (COL FN Maude) -- and then used Maude's errors to condemn Clausewitzian theory. Between Graham's awkward and obsolete translation, Maude's anachronistic intrusions, and Rapoport's hostility (aimed more at the world in general, and at Kissinger in particular, than at Clausewitz personally), the Penguin edition is badly misleading as to Clausewitz's own ideas. If you have any version of the Graham or Graham/Maude translation, but especially this twisted Penguin version, I'd advise you to get the modern Howard/Paret edition [ISBN 0691018545 for paperback; in hardcover 0679420436 (recommended) or 0679420436].
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Summary: An excellent but dry read
Review: Clauswitz's insights of Nepolionic warfare from the tactical to the operational to the strategic level are extremely enlightening and quite relevant today, exactly 170 years after he wrote it. The introduction by Dr. Rappaport is in itself an excellent analysis of how Clauswitz is and should be seen in the modern world (1960's). The translation has not been watered down and keeps it classical verse, this, though charming, creates the only con of the book; it was probably the driest book I have read. But I wouldn't have had it any other way. What I though most interesting was CLauswitz's opposition to "theory for theory's sake." In any event, no serious student of military and/or political science can do without reading this book.
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Summary: Gutes Buch
Review: Dieses Buch ist sehr gut. Sie muss "On War" auf Clausewitz gelesen.
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Summary: Not a Complete Translation
Review: I agree wholeheartedly with the comments written by Edward J. Hynes. This version has several of Clausewitz's 'books' missing. I would like to add that in general, I tend to stay away from books published by Penguin Classics and prefer other publishers. For example, Oxford World's Classics 'The Gallic War' is a better, more modern translation of the first installment of Caesar's Commentaries with more maps and a better introduction that Penguin Classics 'The Conquest of Gaul.'
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Summary: A book to read many times
Review: I am not a specialist on war matters and least of all interested in such a stuff. But "On War" is one of a kind and useful to, and readable by, both the war strategist as the common reader as myself, who will gain a good insight on some strategical and tactical points present on the decision making process a general commanding a war planning and operation has to take. Even when the author treats specific warfare matters, he wins our attention trough the richness of simple concepts, which could also be applied on a lot of human decisions, mainly business ones. Cause, as Clausewits notes, after all war is a human enterprise, indeed a very brutal one, where humans are tested to their limits both in the physical exertions war demands as in the psychological level associated with it. So, it is natural that war demands some very special human physical and psychological characteristics, be them from the general who commands and plans a war attack or defense and has to keep his troops with a high morale, be from the split soldier who is alone on the front-line and , to prevail over the enemy or in order to survive, has to retain the "esprit de corps" the commander infused on him. This in fact is not a book for reading just one time. Keep with yourself after reading, you will return to it to from time to time.
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Summary: Conceptually masterful - poor Translation
Review: I believe that this book approaches more strategic thought - as it pertains to business and modern strategic planning - than it pertains to modern warfare. A must for most international business people and financiers. I would not advise anybody to accept the dated (war) tactics as gospel truth but rather conceptualize the depth of proposed strategic thought carefully, internalizing and putting into practice in modern competitive business scenarios. If one wished to be a successful, international corporate leader, one must keep von Clausewitz close to the heart. Not for the weak minded! The translation of this edition is horribly mechanical, sentences are way too long and hard to follow (although that would be the case in the original German). Prosit!
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Summary: AVOID the Penguin Edition of "On War"
Review: I don't know if the translation is bad or Clausewitz could not express himself clearly but the book is hard to read. What do you make of paragraphs like the following one:
"But after his [Frederick the Great's] skilful application of the system of husbanding his resources had shown the powers allied against him, through a seven years' struggle, that the actual expenditure of strength far exceeded what they had at first anticipated, they made peace."
Since Clausewitz is considered a classic, I am much more inclined to blame it on the translator. Everyone who studied German knows that you can't translate word for word. German grammar is different. They put verbs in weird places.
I don't know if other translations are any better but this one is definitely hard to read.
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