Rating: 
Summary: Will Add Value To Your Life!
Review: Ranked up there with the Prince, and The Art of War. The main benefit to this book is that it exposes the reality that Political agendas dictate War strategy. After the 2-3 introductions, the information grabs you. Buy it as a collectors item, for a class, for education, for entertainment, JUST BUY IT!
You will ascertain how wars are won on the Battle field and Board Room.
Rating: 
Summary: On War (Penguin)
Review: The book itself is unquestionably a classic. Anyone interested in strategy should read it. However, this translation is amongst the worst. The original German text is translated almost literally into English, preserving the difficult grammar constructions. A reader must truely be dedicated, or already know German grammar, to get through this translation.
Read the book, but go instead for the Everyman's version. A great translation and interesting introduction by Peter Paret.
Rating:
Summary: On War (Penguin)
Review: The book itself is unquestionably a classic. Anyone interested in strategy should read it. However, this translation is amongst the worst. The original German text is translated almost literally into English, preserving the difficult grammar constructions. A reader must truely be dedicated, or already know German grammar, to get through this translation.
Read the book, but go instead for the Everyman's version. A great translation and interesting introduction by Peter Paret.
Rating:
Summary: A great analysis of von Clausewitz's time and writings.
Review: The editor's introduction does an excellent job of describing the historical setting of von Clausewitz and the influences that shaped him. The book could be enhanced by an expanded section on comparative military philosophy. Highly recommended to those seeking the origins on "modern" military and political philosophy.
Rating: 
Summary: Great Book--But Get A Different Version
Review: The first time I read Carl von Clausewitz's classic "On War" was in college. Reading it again, some eleven years later, I certainly was impressed anew with the thoughts Clausewitz shared, although there were some things that I had problems with in the book. Clausewitz's theories of war were shaped in large part by the defeats suffered by the Prussians at the hands of Napoleon and the Grande Armee. The culminating battles at Jena and Auerstadt were particularly impressive, as they were routs that represented the new thinking in war. Until Napoleon, war was an activity for the aristocrats, and it was not fought for the purpose of engendering the total destruction of the enemy. War was almost gentlemanly in nature and execution. After Napoleon, war became an activity for the masses, with conscription and patriotic fervor driving the activity more and more. And generals emulated Napoleon in fighting wars to achieve the destruction of the enemy. Clausewitz uses Napoleon as an example of military dos and don'ts, as well as citing to the example of Frederick the Great. That is appropriate--upon defeating the Prussians, Napoleon took his general staff to visit Frederick's tomb. When they arrived at the tomb, Napoleon ordered his generals "hats off boys. If he [Frederick] were alive, we wouldn't be here." Clausewitz also cites to other examples to illustrate his general points. The problem is that he doesn't do that until well after the beginning of the book, meaning that when Clausewitz is laying down general principles of war at the beginning of the book, his writing is devoid of examples. In general, Clausewitz makes the following points: 1. War is the continuation of politics by other means; 2. Deception is the basis for acts of war; 3. A warmaking party must have a clear idea of national goals, and how those goals are to be achieved; 4. War is required to force an enemy to perform acts in accordance with the will of the warmaking party; 5. The destruction of the enemy is the ultimate objective of war. On this last point, Clausewitz reveals just how instrumental Napoleon's influence was on his thinking: "If the enemy is thrown off balance, he must not be given time to recover. Blow after blow must be struck in the same direction: the victor, in other words, must strike with all his strength... by daring to win all, will one really defeat the enemy." This represents a clear departure from the pre-Napoleonic conduct and code of war. The specifics of On War revolve around extremely technical and detailed instruction on strategy and tactics--including specified recommendations on what an army must do in certain situations. This technical discussion, along with the fact that the text is translated from the original German, makes much of "On War' dry reading. I'm half ready to learn German itself to be able to avoid reading another such dry translation--Nietzsche's "The Birth of Tragedy and the Genealogy of Morals" is a more gripping read, despite the fact that it is more ponderous and philosophical, while Clausewitz's tract is more practical and down to earth. Another problem with the book is the foreword and afterword given by Anatol Rapaport, the translator. Rapaport performs a hatchet job on Clausewitzian beliefs, and the realist theory of international relations. Rapaport wrote the translation and his thoughts in 1967, near the height of the Vietnam War, and much of his own commentary is laced with a "war, what is it good for?" tone. By the time I reached the afterword, I half expected Rapaport to break into "Give Peace A Chance." Obviously, war is deplorable, but the fact remains that it is used as an instrument of national policy--which Clausewitz pointed out. Clausewitz made this observation neutrally--neither praising the existence of war, nor condemning it, just recognizing its existence. However, Rapaport seemed to think that Clausewitz and the realists endorsed warfare, and launched into a bitter diatribe against Clausewitz and the realists, virtually accusing them of being bloodthirsty and sadistic warmongers. This bile-infused tone tends to make the reading of the foreword and afterword significantly unenjoyable. It should be noted that Rapaport was educated at the University of Chicago--my alma mater. The international relations and political science professors with whom I studied at the College and graduate school in Chicago, would have rolled their eyes in exasperation at Rapaport's naivete. In any event, readers may want to consider these facts in deciding what translation of Clausewitz they may wish to purchase. All in all, however, I would recommend the book. Clausewitz, like Machiavelli, needs to be read and reread from time to time, especially in times like these, when we are at war. It is never too late to learn something from past masters at war and statecraft.
Rating: 
Summary: The bible of warfare
Review: The translation leaves something to be desired, but Clausewitz's book itself really is the bible of modern warfare and ought to be the first book anyone reads on the subject. The translation would get 2 stars but Clausewitz's work definitely gets 5.
Rating:
Summary: A Must Read!
Review: This a classic, a must read for anyone interested in military strategy. I haven't had trouble reading unlike many reviewers but may be it was because i wasn't reading a penguin edition. Whatever the case is this is an excellent book on the subject.
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Summary: A Classic, but....read Sun Tzu also!
Review: This book, above all, justifies itself for its dictum about war baing the continuation of politics by other means. However, many of its readers have failed to understand, dialetically, that politics is the continuation of war by other means, and that therefore there is a dialectical unity between war and politics which precludes the idea of war as annihilation of the enemy. That was an error never commited by Sun Tzu, who regarded supreme skill as subduing the enemy without having to fight, a lesson not learned by many that chose to cling to Clausewitz's book, with his Machiavellian idea of war as a purely zero-sun-game. The tranlation is good, although a little Edwardian - and therefore, heavy. Highly recommended, if read conjointly with Sun Tzu's _Art of War_
Rating:
Summary: Text on War
Review: This is not an easy book to read nor understand. It takes several readings. A large investment in time will allow the reader to understand Clausewitz's system and the remarkable way that it stills aides in understanding the phenomenon of war. The text is adorned with many historical examples. Continuously emphasizing that war is 'a continuity of policy by other means. He has defined perfectly the theory of war, its tactical and strategic purposes. A must for an military or political leader.
Rating:
Summary: The Classic on war
Review: This is not an easy book to understand. It takes sustained attention, several readings of the most important parts, guidance from supplementary articles, time and interest. After the required investment, the diligent reader will come to understand Clausewitz's system and the remarkable way that it stills aides in understanding the phenomenon of war. Readers who know of what I speak will agree that the results of the recent NATO war against Serbia over Kosova can be explained very accurately in Clausewitzian terms. Much has been made of the fact that Clausewitz died before he could complete the work. We will never know what added insights the Prussian philosopher may have been able to come up with or the additional nuances that he may have added to the framework that he had established. While true, this attitude detracts from what he was able to accomplish. The only finished portion of the book, Part 1 of Book 1 is also the most important. The rest of Book 1, Book 2, Book 3 and Book 8 (the last) are in Bernard Brodie's words, "pure gold". The other books have relevant information for our times too, but one must shift through much which belongs to the past. Clausewitz's theory of war considered war to be "a remarkable trinity" of rational action (policy), irrational action (passion) and the play of chance (friction versus genius). These three points act as poles above which "theory" itself is suspended like a magnet. Alan D. Beyerchen has pointed out that Clausewitz was talking about a non-linear system in that the course the magnet will take as it hovers above and in and out of the three fields of attraction produces an irreproducible trajectory highly sensitive to the initial conditions which set it in motion. In addition we have other important concepts such as the duel nature of war, the importance and uses of theory, friction, war's psychological element, tactical and strategic centers of gravity, and of course the primacy of policy over purely military concerns in strategic planning. All of these are still of interest today. Not bad for a work that was published initially in 1832! One additional note. I recommend the Everyman's Library Edition of On War. First it is the Michael Howard / Peter Paret translation which is the best in English. Second it contains four interesting and enlightening articles by Howard, Paret and Bernard Brodie and last it is a hard cover book printed and bound in Germany and of excellent quality.
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